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In September 2009, as part of the surveillance during the Influenza A(2009) pandemic, Bel-
gium introduced a web-based surveillance system aimed at recording hospitalisations and 
deaths attributable to Influenza in real time. 
Methods 
We present the web-based application developed for the pandemic as well as a descriptive 
analysis of Severe Acute Respiratory Infection (SARI) cases reported through this system. 
Results 
From 1 September to 31 December 2009, 1723 SARI-related hospitalisations potentially due 
to influenza were reported in Belgium. The median age of the patients was 29 years (range: 
< 1 year-99 years). Among SARI-hospitalised patients 68% were aged less than 45 years, 
10.6% were vaccinated with the seasonal influenza vaccine and 7.5% with the pandemic 
influenza vaccine. No deaths were recorded.  
Conclusions 
This first experience showed the feasibility of getting real-time information from hospitals 
during a public health crisis. However, the absence of death detected through the system 
highlighted the importance of better defining the severity of the hospital cases.  
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Introduction 
From April 2009, the reports on the first cases of Influenza A(H1N1)2009 showed a moderate 
severity of the disease (1-2), most patients experiencing a self-limited illness, except in some 
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groups at higher risk of severe disease and deaths (3-4). The monitoring of the severity of 
the new variant influenza by Member States was highly recommended by the ECDC and the 
WHO (3-5). In Belgium, no system for reporting influenza-related hospitalised cases and 
influenza-specific deaths existed before the pandemic.  
Hospital-based surveillance for severe acute respiratory infections (SARI) can help in charac-
terising the risks of clinical disease, severity and death, and in identifying the risk groups and 
risk settings (6). Drawing a picture of severe cases asks for a complex and demanding hospi-
tal-based surveillance system. However, in the early phase of the pandemic, a significant 
increase in the workload of emergency wards was expected (1-4), limiting the possibility to 
add tasks for surveillance and reporting. The hospital representatives required a light set of 
variables to be recorded at the entry point of the hospital only. With this constraint, no follow-
up of the patients within the hospital was possible and the clinical outcomes of the patient, 
such as deaths, could not be recorded.  
The system aimed at recording all hospitalisations for SARI during the Influenza 
A(H1N1)2009 pandemic. This paper describes the surveillance system and the weekly inci-
dence of SARI cases by age and geographical area from week 39 to week 53 in 2009 in 
Belgium.  
Methods 
In August, pilot hospitals tested a web-based application known as ‘eH1N1’. Next, the Scien-
tific Institute of Public Health (WIV-ISP) invited the 147 Belgian hospitals with emergency 
wards to participate, on a voluntary base, in the SARI surveillance.  
The surveillance started on 1 September 2009. It consisted of real-time notifications of SARI 
admissions in the web-based application eH1N1. The date of admission, the vaccine status 
for seasonal and pandemic influenza, and the national number of the patient were collected. 
From the national number, the eH1N1 application deduced the year of birth and the postcode 
of residence of the patient. WIV-ISP was provided with a code unique per patient, which per-
mitted the identification of double entries and multiple hospitalisations. Due to privacy 
protection constraints, the sex of the patient was not transmitted.  
The eH1N1 application checked the vital status of the patients by linking the national number 
of SARI patients to the national register of the population. The death of a patient could be 
detected up to two months after his or her admission.  
Each week, WIV-ISP sent a recall mail to the person in charge of the surveillance in the hos-
pital. We asked the hospitals to explicitly report zero cases when they had no SARI 
hospitalisations, to make sure no cases were omitted or forgotten. 
Results were presented in the weekly Belgian Influenza bulletin and published on the inter-
net.  
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We used the WHO definition for SARI: a person with sudden onset of fever >38°C and cough 
or sore throat in the absence of any other diagnosis and shortness of breath or difficulty 
breathing and requiring hospital admission (6).  
In order to introduce this surveillance system, a formal ethical approval was obtained from 
the Belgian Commission for the protection of privacy.  
Data analysis  
We carried out descriptive statistics for all study variables. All cases were included in the 
analysis. We categorised patients according to age groups. Statistical analysis was con-
ducted using Stata v10 (StataCorp, College Station, TX, USA). 
Results 
During the period from 1 September 2009 to the end of December 2009, 1723 hospitalisa-
tions due to SARI were reported. Among all Belgian hospitals (n=147), 85 (60.3%) agreed to 
participate in this surveillance and an average of 40 (range 39-53) hospitals reported cases 
of SARI every week. This number varied from week to week. The number of notified SARI 
increased from week 40 to week 45 consistently with the epidemic curve of ILI (Figure 1) and 
the mean weekly number reported per hospital varied from 0.9 to 3.8 at the peak. 
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The median age of all cases was 29 years (range <1 year to 99 years). Sixty-eight percent of 
cases appeared to be people under 45 years of age. Most SARI cases were children, and 
the 0 to 5 year group represented 33.2% of all SARI.  
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The overall rate of hospitalisation per million inhabitants was 169, ranging from 153 in those 
aged 85 years or older to 967 in infants younger than 5 years (Figures 2 and 3).  
Figure 2. SARI incidence per million inhabitants, by age group, Belgium, September-December 2009 
 
Figure 3. Weekly SARI hospitalisation rates per age group (September-December 2009) 
 
In Belgium, the vaccination against seasonal influenza started in week 40 (beginning of Oc-
tober) and the vaccination against pandemic influenza started in week 45 for the health staff 
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ised from mid-October, 10.6% (67/630) were vaccinated with the seasonal trivalent influenza 
vaccine. Among SARI cases hospitalised from mid-November, 7.5% (13/173) had been vac-
cinated with the new pandemic influenza vaccine. 
The system did not report any deaths among patients hospitalised during this period and 
registered in the surveillance database.  
Discussion 
This was the first attempt of the Belgian Influenza surveillance system to record SARI poten-
tially attributed to influenza. From conception, the system wanted to limit additional work in 
emergency wards for surveillance purposes. The timeliness of reporting was a major benefit 
of the system, balanced by a lack of information to complete a description of hospitalised 
cases. 
The participation in the surveillance was voluntary and we observed a strong heterogeneity 
in the reporting among regions. A higher proportion of Flemish hospitals reported cases than 
in other regions (Brussels, Wallonia) (Figure 4). 
Figure 4. Reporting of Severe Acute Respiratory Illness in Belgium, fall 2009:  
percentage of hospitals that reported data on SARI per province 
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The median age of hospital cases was 29 years, lower than expected in seasonal influenza 
(7-9). Most hospital admissions were observed in patients younger than 45 year (7-10). In 
our series, the SARI hospitalisation rate per 100,000 was comparable among age groups, 
ranging from 10.4 to 19.1, with the exception of infants who had the highest rate with 95.4 
SARI hospital admissions per 100,000 inhabitants. Data collected by the surveillance do not 
permit to score the severity of hospitalised patients, especially among children. Some of the 
children were probably hospitalised due to precautionary measures rather than to severe 
complications (11-12). 
The results were consistent with those found in other studies (3, 13-15). However, our case 
definition of SARI was not specific and did not require laboratory case confirmation, which 
could explain a higher hospitalisation rate in our series.  
Changes in SARI hospitalisation rates may provide information on the burden of the epi-
demic in hospital services. One of the major shortcomings in our system was the lack of 
additional criteria to score the severity of the cases. Data were collected at the entry point of 
the hospital and no follow-up information was collected. The duration of the hospital stay, 
rates of complications and/or outcomes and admission to intensive care units were thus un-
known. It was only possible to relate SARI patients to the death register. Strangely enough, 
none of our patients died in the two months following their hospital admission. This absence 
of mortality in our SARI population is highly questionable. One hypothesis is that severity 
was not a major criterion leading to hospitalisation in our series. Another possibility is that a 
more specific case definition is necessary. Yet, the trends of SARI were perfectly consistent 
with the trends of ILI recorded by the sentinel network of general practitioners (16).  
Conclusions 
This experience of SARI surveillance in Belgium showed the feasibility of getting real-time 
information from hospitals. This is important for managing health-related crises such as pan-
demic influenza. However, the current system did not provide sufficient information on the 
severity of SARI cases and this experience demonstrated that collecting data on hospitalisa-
tion only is insufficient to score the severity of an event. To define those severity criteria while 
respecting the workload and organisational constraints of emergency services will constitute 
the next challenge for the monitoring of public health events. 
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